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Stasi Files and GDR Espionage Against the West 
The Seizure of Stasi Buildings in 
1989/90 and the Stasi Records 
Law of 1991 
The East German experience of 1989 was in 
many ways different from the downfall pat-
tern of other Warsaw Pact countries' regimes. 
Concerning the legacy of a repressive regime's 
intelligence files, the former German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) was even unique. At-
tempts by its intelligence agency "Ministry 
for State Security" (Ministerium flir Staats-
sicherheit" - Stasi) to burn their files without 
having the capacity to conceal smoking chim-
neys, were met by civic resistance groups all 
over the GDR entering and seizing Stasi 
buildings. Such targeted and persistent attacks 
on a central nerve center of communist re-
gimes were without analogies in the countries 
of the Soviet bloc. 
Between 4th and 7th December 1989 the 
Stasi buildings in all district cities and most 
of the county towns all over the GDR were 
stormed and seized by spontaneously ar-
ranged citizens' committees. All remaining 
files and documents were secured and sea-
led. Those were the days when the Central 
Committee of the "Socialist Unity Party" 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands/-
SED), the GDR's communist party, had dis-
banded itself and the GDR's financial wizard 
for acquiring capitalist hard 'valuta' currency, 
Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, feared for 
his life in the GDR and defected to the West, 
where he got debriefed by West Germany's 
intelligence service. After December 7 only 
the Stasi headquarters in Berlin were still in 
business, since people living in the GDR's 
former center of power did not dare to enter 
the huge compound. Finally on 15 January 
1990 there were efforts made to negotiate a 
takeover combined with simultaneous pres-
sure from outside demonstrators. They resul-
ted in the seizure of still remaining, quite 
comprehensive central files as well. 
In the following months leading toward 
German unification in October 1990, citizens' 
committees in East Germany oversaw the 
dismantling of the Stasi. They regarded its 
files as property of the public and fenced off 
all attempts by the West German government 
to close them forever or at least move them 
to the West German Federal Archive with its 
strict archival guidelines and then across-the-
board 30-Years-Rule. The first freely elected 
East German parliament passed a law on 
handling and accessing the files in August 
1990. The German Unification Treaty created 
a special body to administer the files headed 
by Joachim Gauck until new regulations 
would have been passed by all-German par-
liament after unification. The final "Law on 
the Files of the State Security Service of the 
former German Democratic Republic" was 
then codified on 20 December 1991 and came 
into effect a few days later on 1 January 
1992. 1 When the new "Authority of the Fed-
eral Envoy for the Materials of the Ministry 
for State Security of the former GDR" ,2 which 
soon became popularly known as 'Gauck 
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Authority', officially began its work at the 
same day, it had at its disposal files at a length 
of altogether 180 kilometers designed for pub-
lic use. 
Since 1992 all individual German or foreign 
citizens, on which the Stasi had created files, 
are entitled to apply for checking and reading 
them in the newly established federal authority. 
According to the Stasi records law, academic 
and other researchers, as well as the press, 
were granted the right to see all non-personal 
files, personal files of Stasi informers and the 
surveillance files of so-called "people of 
contemporary history". The latter clause for 
prominents was very generously interpreted 
and affected various intellectuals and politi-
cians of all kinds, down to many lower-ranking 
officials in East and West Germany. Recently 
this clause was overturned by the Federal 
Administrative Court after former Federal 
Chancellor Helm ut Kohl had issued a lawsuit 
to deny public access to his Stasi files. In the 
wake of the court's decision, the Federal 
Authoriry on the Stasi files, meanwhile headed 
by Marianne Birthler, was temporarily re-
quired to block further access to some of its 
papers on prominents and to blacken many 
names from copies handed out until then 
without such deletions. In all likelihood the 
German Parliament will take up this issue and 
amend the current Stasi Records Law in the 
near future, though without fully returning 
to status quo ante. 
The Foreign Intelligence Files 
The so-called "foreign intelligence lines" 
within the Stasi consisted of the Berlin center 
of the "Hauptverwaltung Aufkliirung" (HVA) 
and the Departments XV in the fifteen district 
Stasi headquarters all over the GDR. In 
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October 1989 approximately 5.000 full-time 
employees worked for these "foreign intel-
ligence" units, among them 4.000 in Berlin. 
Compared to the 1950s the number of officers 
was ten times as high at the end of the GDR 
and had tripled since the heydays of detente 
in 1972. If one also includes the signal 
intelligence people and the military and ad-
ministrative staff of the intelligence service 
of the Ministry of Defense, roughly 10.000 
people within the GDR worked in "foreign 
intelligence". In relation to the overall popu-
lation this was by any proportions a world 
record. Only the KGB and the CIA were 
numerically somewhat stronger, but they 
operated from countries with more than two 
hundred million people compared to the 16.5 
million population of the GDR. In 1988 these 
foreign intelligence officers directed about 
3.000 agents of various status and intensity 
in the FRG alone. Agents from other foreign 
countries are significantly lower than this 
number. 3 So far the latter are not fully ac-
counted for unless the CIA will let us know 
the full scope of the files it acquired in 1992 
('Rosenholz').4 
Besides this human intelligence, the Stasi 
had an ever-increasing capaciry and capability 
of signal intelligence. At least since the mid-
1970s it could listen not just into every phone 
conversation between West and East Ger-
many. It also targeted certain objects and indi-
viduals in West Berlin and West Germany and 
tapped their lines whenever they became busy. 
Those conversations were recorded, tran-
scribed, summarized and sometimes even 
analyzed. As a matter of fact the Stasi was 
able to target basically every phone conversa-
tion originating from West Berlin or within 
West Germany, including government lines 
in the far away Western federal capital of 
Bonn in the Rhineland. 
The "Rosenholz" File Cards 
In 1985 Stasi Minister Erich Mielke, still pre-
paring for emergency measures against a nuc-
lear attack from the West, ordered to micro-
film all 317.000 personal file cards with the real 
names of all HVA agents and 77.000 file cards 
with codewords of HVA operations. In 
addition, on his order also computerized 
forms had to be prepared on each individual 
agent holding some basic information on the 
nature of the contact. Whereas the paper file 
cards were destroyed in early 1990, one micro-
film copy had apparently made it to the KGB. 
From there supposedly the CIA obtained the 
films in 1992 and brought them to its center 
in Langley for scrutiny. According to another 
rumor a former Stasi Major General sold it 
to the CIA for 1.5 million U.S. dollars.5 
It took a while for German authorities to 
find out about this coup. Finally there was 
an arrangement set up for West German intel-
ligence officers to travel to the United States 
and transcribe during many weeks in 1993 
the information in these films concerning 
West German agents only. The West German 
service called this operation on the more or 
less friendly territory of Northern Virginia 
"Rosenholz". As a result of this operation, 
back in Germany many agents were identified, 
but the trials they were put on produced com-
paratively minor sentences. Besides formal facts 
like in which period a particular agent worked 
for the Stasi, what his code-name was, whether 
he used technical devices to communicate 
with his handlers in East Berlin and the num-
ber of pages in his destroyed working file, there 
was not much substance to sentence somebody 
on this basis to a significant term in prison. 
Sharing this assessment, the United States 
FBI felt the need to produce additional evi-
dence. In the cases of the rather minor Ameri-
can Stasi agent couple Kurt Stand and Teresa 
Squillacote, identified by the microfilms, they 
launched a scx:alled "sting operation" to prove 
the couple's ongoing willingness to spy for 
communist causes, in this case for South 
Africa. Since Mrs. Squillacote, who worked 
at that time in the Pentagon, fell into this trap, 
the U.S. Government built a case mostly on 
that recent incident and sentenced the couple 
to very harsh 21 respectively 17 years in 
prison in accordance with U.S. law on del-
ivering classified government material to a 
foreign power.6 Their sentences alone almost 
exceed the ones for all convicted West Ger-
man HVA spies combined. 
The SIRA Tapes 
Some of these sentences in West Germany 
might have been higher, had the decoding of 
the so-called SIRA tapes not occurred in 1998 
but somewhat earlier. This "System Informa-
tion Recherche Aufkliirung" (SIRA) consisted 
of computerized data bases, in which the HVA 
put the headlines of almost every single "in-
formation" obtained by its different agents 
together with other statistical data including 
evaluating grades on an information's value. 
These electronic tapes were destroyed in the 
early 1990s, but copies turned up later with 
the former East German army where the 
'Gauck-Authority' discovered and decoded 
them in many years work. 
For the period between 1969 and 1989 there 
have been 4.500 different ,sources" with 
codenames identified, although this number 
is not identical with the actual number of 
individual agents.7 Some codenames were 
used to conceal electronic sources. In other 
cases the number of "informations" attributed 
to certain agents might not match their actual 
output. Anyway, a fraction of the printed "in-
formation" left over in 1990 might now be 
traced to individual agents since the SIRA 
tapes contain the call numbers of these 
"informations". 
The whole SIRA tapes complex could be 
appropriately described as an excellent archi-
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val finding aide or a decent library catalogue 
- but without any files or books to order. A 
very important aspect of the SIRA tapes was 
their discovery and decoding as such. It finally 
made the CIA in 1999 to accept a trade with 
the German government to deliver CD-ROMs 
with 'Rosenholz' file cards and forms to Ger-
many and obtain in turn copies of the SIRA 
tapes. Together these t\vo sources contribute 
to an assessment of the intensity and value of 
various HVA agents. 
GDR Espionage Against the West 
As a reflection of a period of increasing cold 
war tensions, in 1980 the HVA listed among 
ten complexes of intelligence gathering at the 
first position: "Military policy, military plan-
ning and intentions, military potential of 
NATO, USA, FRG, other main imperialistic 
powers and the PRC"'. The second position 
was reserved for "armament research and 
armament production in the USA and other 
NATO countries, particularly development 
and production of new strategic weapons and 
weapon systems". Only on third position 
there was the actual "policy of USA, NATO 
and FRG vis-a-vis the member states of the 
socialist comm uniry" .9 
Of the eighteen HVA departments only four 
were assigned to monitor and infiltrate speci-
fic countries respectively their institutions: 
Department I (Federal Republic of Germany/ 
FRG government), I! (FRG parties and 
institutions), XI (USA) and XII (NATO and 
European Community). Besides the latter t\vo 
all other departments were more or less focus-
ed on the FRG anyway, for instance Depart-
ment IV (Military Espionage). Actual Stasi 
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intelligence on policy and strategy developed 
in the USA itself was almost negligible. 
Knowledge about the U.S. was almost ex-
clusively limited to the military theater of 
West Germany and consisted of mostly short· 
living human and technical sources in the U.S. 
Military in West Berlin respectively West 
Germany or of a staff member from the U.S. 
Embassy in Bonn. 
Pe11etratio11 of West German 
Government and Intelligence Services 
The HVA, on the other hand, was very 
successful in placing agents in the Federal 
Chancellery as well as in various ministries 
of the Federal Government. 10 Since those 
agents were mostly serving in administrative 
staff functions, they were excellent in de-
livering secret documents and internal infor-
mation. However, with very few exceptions, 
they were not themselves involved with 
decision making. In 1988, for instance, the 
Stasi had two agents connected to the center 
of FRG executive power - a female technical 
assistant in the Federal Chancellery and a 
political scientist working for government 
affiliated think tanks. Of course there had 
been the famous case of Giinter Guillaume, 
a "sleeper agent" of the HVA emigrating to 
West Germany in the 1950s and rising 
through the ranks of the Social Democratic 
Party right into the staff of Chancellor Willy 
Brandt after 1969. Identified in 1974, he was 
arrested and later traded for Western agents 
to the GDR. Guillaume, who contributed to 
the down-fall of Brandt by also spying on him 
during his vacations in Norway, provided the 
GDR with a wealth of information on 
Brandt's policies and personality, but in the 
end politic-ally burned the very politician the 
HVA so desperately wanted to keep in office 
during the debate over the no-confidence vote 
in the German parliament of May 1972. 
Brandt had survived this motion by just one 
vote. After the political opposition had bought 
some members of Brandt's coalition to defect 
him, the Stasi was very likely instrumental 
in buying two CDU parliamentarians to 
secretly vote for Brandt, maybe the only case 
when the Stasi really influenced German 
politics. Nevertheless six months later in 
November 1972 Brandt won an over-
whelming election victory without any help 
by the Stasi. 
With regard to other federal ministries, the 
Stasi had recruited between one and two 
lower-ranking division heads as well as fe-
male technical assistants and people working 
in affiliate institutions of almost every depart-
ment. Particularly affected were the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, where the Stasi had obtain-
ed the cooperation of a few minor diplomats, 
and the Ministries of the Interior, Economic 
Affairs and Intra-German Relations. Agents 
within these institutions provided a wealth 
of documents and information for the GDR. 
It might be fairly concluded, however, that 
their actual influence on shaping or changing 
political strategies and events in the West was 
very much limited. Such active involvement 
also was not part of their assignments given 
from East Berlin. They were just expected to 
collect as much information as possible with-
out arousing any suspicion of being affiliated 
with or sympathetic to East German causes. 
Thus it was up to the East German political 
decision makers to use the massive insights 
into the FRG provided by the HVA for further-
ing the interests of the GDR. But if it comes 
to an analysis of the actual East German ad-
vantages stemming from the espionage on the 
West German government, there is not this 
much left to say. Obviously it hasn't contri-
buted to a enlightening of the mindset or at 
least a refining of political strategies of the 
East German communists. This was mostly 
due to the rigid ideological framework and 
the Byzantine power structures in the GDR 
politburo, but also to the problem of making 
use of all this clandestine information without 
compromising or identifying the valuable 
Stasi sources in the West. 
But there should be no down playing of the 
successes and achievements of East German 
intelligence at all. Those are becoming easily 
evident if one shifts the focus from surveil-
lance or influencing the FRG Government to 
the operational influence on the three West 
German intelligence services. Since the late 
1960s the HVA effectively could monitor and 
thwart all relevant West German intelligence 
efforts on GDR territory. 11 These Eastern 
intelligence coups were never matched by any 
similar Western penetration of Eastern 
services. 
Already in the 1950s the KGB was able to 
recruit as an agent the leader of the counter-
espionage division against the USSR in the 
FRG's foreign intelligence service BND.12 De-
tected and arrested in 1961, Heinz Felfe was 
later traded to the GDR in exchange for Wes-
tern agents. Never detected were two Stasi 
top agents in the END working there from 
the early 1970s up to 1989. Alfred Spuhler 
worked in the division of sources from com-
munist countries; Gabriele Gast worked in 
the analysis department and later became 
deputy of the Soviet Union division. 
With Hans-Joachim Tiedge's defection to 
the GDR in 1985, the domestic intelligence 
service BNtJ unexpectedly lost a high-ranking 
division head. Only in 1989 did it become 
aware of the espionage activity of Tiedge's 
subordinate Klaus Kuron from the so-called 
,countermen operations division', who had 
offered the Stasi his services in 1982. Even 
worse hit was the West German military 
intelligence service MAD 14 , whose deputy 
chief, Colonel Joachim Krase, worked for the 
Stasi from 1973 until his death in 1988. 
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Espionage against NATO 
The East German intelligence success story 
continues when we proceed to military espio-
nage against the German Ministry of Defense, 
the German Federal Army and NATO Head-
quarters. Following the Soviet model of KGB 
and GRU, the GDR had founded and created 
two separate foreign intelligence services, 
both working on military matters: The "Mili-
tary Intelligence Service" (Militarischer Nach-
richtendienst/ MilND) integrated in the East 
German Ministry of Defense and the political 
intelligence of the HVA within the Ministry 
for State Security. Omitting institutional his-
tory details of these two services since the 
1950s, we might base the following analysis 
of GDR military espionage on the combined 
forces of the two services. 15 
By its partners in the Warsaw Pact, MilND 
was assigned West Berlin, FRG, Benelux and 
Denmark as explicit areas of operation. It also 
organized the service of military attaches in 
GDR embassies worldwide, recruiting them 
and sometimes additional embassy personnel 
as their informers. Relying not just on human 
intelligence, information was also gathered 
to a great extent by signal and electronic sour-
ces. Presenting intelligence findings right to 
the military leadership, the MilND's analyses 
were blunt, filled with ideological phrases and 
had the tendency to overstate the strength of 
the enemy in order to justify and increase the 
defense budget (sounds like a familiar pattern 
to Western defense analysts). In 1989 it em-
ployed 1146 soldiers and civilians in all its 
GDR facilities. At that time it directed 293 
agents worldwide, among them 138 in the 
FRG. 
But MilND never was really independent. 
When the West German intelligence service 
had been successful to hire MilND officers 
at highest levels up to 1958, the Defense 
Ministry's intelligence service soon came un-
der the control of the Stasi, which secretly 
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penetrated its fraternal partner service to a 
high degree, treated it like a subordinate and 
dependent body and 'stole' a lot of its intelli-
gence. There was a lot of double work, but 
combined the results of military intelligence 
were even more impressive than the respective 
record of each service seen in isolation. 
The HVA as the political intelligence branch 
was assigned within the Warsaw Pact the 
targeting of West Berlin, the FRG, USA and 
other NATO countries. It presented its intelli-
gence information to the political leadership 
in less ideological language than the military 
counterparts. In 1988 Department IV of the 
HVA (Military Espionage) directed 74 FRG 
citizens as agents16 , whereas Department XII, 
in charge of infiltrating NATO and EU, had 
72 agents on these institutions on file. 17 
It would consume some considerable time 
and space to tell the stories of all the highly 
valuable agents within the German Ministry 
of Defense, the German Federal Army and 
the U.S. Armed Forces in West Germany and 
Berlin, all of them having obtained from time 
to time also NATO documents for East Berlin 
and Moscow. A focus on the sources known 
to have operated for the GDR services in 
Brussels is quite revealing in a sense. Although 
MilND and HVA could never place sources 
with nuclear target planning decision makers 
or within the operational process of the Su-
preme European Command of NATO in Bel-
gium, from 1967 to 1989 it gathered an ever 
increasing flow of documents from Brussels 
primarily from these sources: 
* Between 1967 and 1979 Ursula Lorenzen 
alias "Michelle" worked as an Assistant to 
the British Director for Operations in NATO's 
General Secretariat. She had been recruited 
in 1962 in West Germany by an East Ger-
man "romeo" agent with the codename of 
"Bordeaux", whom she later married. They 
worked closely together in Brussels before the 
GDR called them back abruptly in 1979, af-
ter a Stasi officer had defected from East Ber-
lin to West Germany. 
'' Rainer Rupp, a student from West Ger-
many, had been recruited by the HVA as an 
informant in 1968 and given the codename 
,Mosel'. In 1972 he married the British citizen 
Ann-Christine Bowen, whom he recruited for 
the HVA himself as "Kriemhild". She worked 
as a secretary in the NATO Integrated Com-
munications System Management Agency at 
that time. In early 1975 she switched to Plans 
and Policy in the International Staff of NATO 
and in 1977 to Office of Security in NATO 
Headquarters. In that year Rupp himself 
finally made it into NATO bureaucracy by 
becoming a country rapporteur in the Direc-
torate for Economics of NATO General Sec-
retariat. When "Michelle" had to be with-
drawn in March 1979, the HVA activitated 
Rupp to fill the gap and he delivered. He even 
inherited "Michelle's" now vacant internal 
Stasi identification number, a highly unusual 
procedure. Now named "Topas", he delivered 
in the next ten years nearly 2500 "informa-
tions" to East Berlin, for instance documents 
on every NATO summit and each meeting of 
the Defense Planning Council and much, 
much more. Every six to eight weeks he was 
on duty in the Situation Center of NATO HQ 
and reported from there. As a result NATO 
defense planning in Brussels was absolutely 
transparent for Moscow in those years. Rupp 
was even considered to early warn the War-
saw Pact of a supposed NATO first strike for 
which HVA provided him with ,technology'. 
If one wants to know more on some GDR 
double work on NATO, here are the sources 
of MilND: 
* Between 1973 and 1980 a Belgian secre-
tary, codename "Weiler", recruited by GDR-
Romeo "Valentin" whom she later married, 
worked in the French Language Staff in 
NATO General Secretariat and delivered 
documents matching HVA-,Michelle" of the 
same period. In 1980 the GDR called the 
couple back to prevent detection. 
'' In 1987 the former West German signal 
officer and diplomat ,Cherry", having 
worked for MilND for many years, e.g. in 
the German embassy in Vienna with its exten-
sive materials on the 'Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction (MBFR)' negotia-tions, was 
finally transferred to Brussels as member of 
the German Delegation to NATO. From his 
work as a signal officer, he could deliver about 
800 pages of documents monthly. 
Almost all this wealth of intelligence on 
NATO obtained by the East German services 
went right to Moscow. Only the Soviet Union 
was capable of evaluating, assessing and 
applying information from those documents 
for the purpose of developing their own 
military strategy and, moreover, of using it 
to advance military technology at home and 
within the Warsaw Pact. For Soviet State 
Holidays the Stasi prepared leather-bound 
booklets for the KGB with cover letters by 
Minister Mielke and some exquisite original 
documents from NATO. In certain cases af-
fected socialist partners in Eastern Europe got 
selected documents (except Romania). The 
analysis departments in HVA and MilND 
were deliberately small and understaffed, and 
despite the overwhelming amount of intel-
ligence raw material the GDR leadership pro-
ved unable to develop a sense for the inner 
sophistication of NATO strategies and 
armaments. 
Paradoxically (or logically?) the superb 
quantity and quality of documents obtained 
from NATO since the late 1960s not only 
scrapped adventurous war scenarios of the 
Warsaw Pact from the 50s and 60s. 18 It also 
encouraged the Soviet Union to follow a more 
aggressive strategy of seeking superiority in 
some fields. Furthermore, in the political con-
text of superpower confrontation, it sub-
stantially increased Moscow's fear of aWes-
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tern nuclear first strike in the early 1980s. 
This Soviet 'War Scare' phenomenon "Wrjan" 
(Veroiatnost Raketno-Iadernogo Napadeniia 
i.e. "Likeliness of Nuclear Missile Attack")19 
and the assessments of threats and threat 
perceptions subsided in the Soviet Union in 
the late 1980s and led to a change of doctrine. 
It would be fascinating to assess the role 
intelligence from GDR agents within NATO 
may have played during those years. Due to 
their activities, the Soviet Union knew all too 
well the real strategies and planning of NATO 
and had two basic options at hand. Both of 
them it pursued for some time - either to 
exploit the weaknesses of NATO by going 
for superiority or to acknowledge its military 
strength and go for negotiation and accom-
modation. 
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For both opposing strategies the material 
from GDR intelligence proved to be vital. 
Through the channels of these agents, who 
absolutely were no 'mediators' at all, NATO 
finally and inadvertently provided to the 
Soviet Union the background for changes in 
military strategy implemented in the late 
Gorbachev era, which were based on a modi-
fied assessment of a potential threat posed 
by NATO to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. 
In the pre-Gorbachev period, however, the 
East German agents would have delivered 
significant and substantial advantages to the 
USSR in a military crisis situation. Indeed they 
were everything else but 'messengers of 
peace', as the GDR's official propaganda 
heralded its Stasi agents on foreign soil. 
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